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FOREWORD

COMPETING AND COMPLEMENTARY RULE
SYSTEMS: CIVIL PROCEDURE AND ADR
Jean t Sternlight* & Judith Resnikt
Professors of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and of civil
procedure often move in different circles. Some professors teach
about ADR in their basic procedure course, some ADR professors may
touch on litigation, and some teach both procedure and ADR. But
overlap is more the exception than the rule. Although the two fields
have a common focus on issues of procedural justice, the two sets of
professors work in professional arenas that have been separately delineated, each with its own set of conferences, newsletters, law journals,
and affiliated practitioners. During the last decade, as the amount of
non-litigation dispute resolution increased, the interconnections between civil procedure and ADR have become more obvious and important. Yet, while the phenomenon of the "vanishing trial" has
received substantial attention,' the relationships among dispute resolution modes have not.
In an effort to enhance communication among all of these
proceduralists, the ADR and Civil Procedure sections of the Associa* Saltman Professor of Law and Director, Saltman Center for Conflict
Resolution, Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. In 2003, the ADR
Section of the Association of American Law Schools was chaired by Professor Suzanne
Schmitz, and the program chair for that year was Professor John Lande. Professor
Sternlight extends her thanks to both for asking her to coordinate the joint program
with the Civil Procedure section.
t Arthur Liman Professor Law, Yale Law School. In 2003, Professor Resnik
chaired the Section on Civil Procedure of the Association of American Law Schools.
Our thanks to the able and thoughtful editors of the Notre Dame Law Review.
1 For a wide-ranging and informative set of articles discussing the "vanishing
trial" phenomenon see Volume 1, Issue 3 of the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies.
Those articles grew out of a project sponsored by the Section of Litigation of the

American Bar Association. For this project, Professor Marc Galanter gathered a substantial amount of data that prompted analysis from an array of commentators.
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tion of American Law Schools (AALS) co-hosted a three-hour session
at the January 2004 AALS Annual Meeting in Atlanta, Georgia. Entitled "Competing or Complementary Rule Systems? Adjudication, Arbitration and the Procedural World of the Future," the session brought
together panelists whose expertises ranged across the academy. The
legal academics were joined by the federal districtjudge now chairing
the committee charged by the Judicial Conference of the United
States to draft federal civil procedural rules.
The stimulating session reflected on the relationship between litigation and non-litigation approaches to dispute resolution. Participants explored common concerns about pedagogy and scholarship,
the increasing relevance of transnational and global practices, and the
economics, sociology, and political economy of dispute resolution systems. We are most fortunate that, with the support of Professor Jay
Tidmarsh, the Notre Dame Law Review offered to publish written papers
and that most of the speakers were able to contribute to the symposium. Below, we provide introductions of the themes of the articles
included here, and we remind readers that two of the presenters, Bryant Garth and Deborah Hensler, relied on already-published work or
have published related comments in other journals.2 In addition, a
recent volume of the Journal of Legal Education contains a symposium
that, like the collection of articles in this volume, also aspires to generate interactive exchanges among those interested in dispute
3
resolution.
As will be plain from reading the articles that follow, the interrelationships among litigation, arbitration, mediation, and negotiation
are many. First, every dispute resolution system has to resolve the
same questions: Who can participate? May participants appeal in a
group as well as individually? What information has to be provided
from one disputant to another? What information is provided to
third parties and what power of decision do third parties have? How
final are those decisions? Who other than disputants may participate?
Does the public have access to either the processes or the outcomes?
Who pays for what aspects of the dispute resolution system?
2 See, e.g., BRYANT GARTH & YVEs DEZALAY, DEALING IN VIRTUE (1996) (exploring
the development of the modern field of international arbitration from a sociological
perspective); Deborah R. Hensler, Money Talks: SearchingforJustice Through Compensation for PersonalInjury and Death, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 417 (2003) (summarizing an empirical study on participants' responses to and experiences with the specially-created
process for compensation to direct victims of the 9/11 attack).
3 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Introduction, Dispute Resolution: Raising the Bar and
Enlargingthe Canon, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 4 (2004).
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Second, these dispute resolution systems do not take place in isolation-as if other options did not exist. Thus, the "border issues"
arising between these two fields are increasingly important. Legal
rules-from statutes and the Constitution to case law and court-based
rules-frame both government-based and private dispute resolution.
Indeed, the market for ADR has flourished in the wake of United
States Supreme Court decisions supporting the enforcement of dispute resolution clauses in a wide array of cases and as disputants and
institutions explore the utility of mediation and of negotiated
settlements.
Third, the various systems sometimes guard their distinctive features and sometimes attempt to export them. One can often find advocates of one form of resolution leery about the incorporation of
features that mark another. ADR proponents worry about undue "legalization" of ADR, increasingly organized through professional communities and regulated by rules of practice. Adjudication's
proponents worry about undue informalization of court-based
processes. The judicial world is now filled with judges trying to be
mediators as well as with specially-chartered auxiliary personnel,
whose names range from "neutral evaluators" to "special masters" to
"parajudicial officers" to "arbitrators" or 'judges pro tem" and whose
jobs are to promote settlement or otherwise resolve cases without
trials.
Fourth, developments in both adjudication and in ADR are themselves artifacts of larger social changes. The discussions about the utility and propriety of these processes need to be grounded in debates
about the relative roles of public and private sectors in governance.
Fifth, everyone worries about how to seekjustice. Whether styled
adjudication, dispute resolution, or alternative dispute resolution,
those who structure processes and those who participate make claims
about doing justice, while critics argue about whether the particular
processes and outcomes deserve to be called 'just." Thus, these articles are rich with philosophical commitments and clashes, with data
and doctrine, and with commentary and conflict, as they debate fundamental questions about the purposes and functioning of justice
systems.
Here, we offer brief summaries of the articles presented. We begin with two articles that analyze the development of ADR in the
United States, then move offshore to consider global trends, and finally consider how these changes affect the work of judges and of law
teachers in the United States.
Professor Keith Hylton, who specializes in the application of economic analysis to legal problems, offers an argument for the utility of
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arbitration. Hylton's article, Arbitration: GovernanceBenefits and Enforcement Costs,4 focuses on two aspects of rules governing private behavior

including both litigation and arbitration. He terms these two aspects
"governance benefits" and "enforcement costs." Hylton suggests that
well-informed parties do and should choose between arbitration and
litigation with respect to which process offers greater governance benefit at lower cost. Reviewing an empirical literature that he recognizes
to be scant, Hylton finds reason to believe that arbitration can, on this
metric, be a "better" dispute resolution technique than litigation. At
the same time, Professor Hylton urges that more empirical work be
done to explore these questions.
We then turn to Professor Katherine V.W. Stone, a scholar of the
laws and practices of both workplaces and of alternative dispute resolution. Her article, Proceduraljustice in the Boundaryless Workplace: The
Tension Between Due Process and Public Policy,5 begins by noting that
more workers are now covered by non-union ADR provisions than are
governed by union contracts. To explain the phenomenon, Stone
points to the shift from long-term employer/employee relations to
briefer interactions in a world full of contingent jobs. Drawing on
literature from the fields of human relations and organizational behavior, Professor Stone suggests that companies rely on ADR programs in an effort to bolster employees' commitment to companies
that are not offering prospects of permanent employment. Stone also
considers the relationship of ADR programs to the changing shape of
discrimination claims. In her view, such claims have become more
difficult to win in court, in part because of changes in doctrine and in
part because discrimination has become more subtle and structural in
nature. Stone argues that workplace ADR can-if properly designed-offer employees processes and forms of remedies not otherwise available. Specifically, Stone urges that companies employ a form
of binding arbitration that would allow decision makers to consider a
broader range of evidence than currenly looked to by courts. Stone
also suggests that governmental regulation is needed to ensure that
workplace ADR is not unfair to employees and addresses due process
concerns.
From these articles, focused primarily on United States experiences, we turn to the article by Professor Christopher Drahozal, discussing parties who seek to avoid national legal regimes. Drahozal,
4

Keith N. Hylton, Arbitration:Governance Benefits and Enforcement Costs, 80 NOTRE
REV. 489 (2005).
5 Katherine V.W. Stone, ProceduralJustice in the Boundaryless Workplace: The Tension Between Due Process and Public Policy, 80 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 501 (2005).
DAME L.
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who is the author of a leading arbitration text and of multiple articles
examining U.S. arbitration law, takes on one aspect of this phenomenon in ContractingOut of NationalLaw: An EmpiricalLook at the New Law
Merchant.6 Emphasizing that arbitration rather than litigation "is the
7
dispute resolution mechanism of choice in international commerce,
Drahozal examines the question of what substantive law parties
choose to have arbitrators apply. He finds that although there has
been a substantial academic debate over the propriety of choosing
transnational common law ("lex mercatoria" or "new law merchant")
rather than the law of any particular country, "[o] nly a small percentage of parties provide for application of transnational commercial law
in their arbitration clauses." Further, "[e]ven when parties do rely on
transnational law, they often do so to supplement rather than displace
national law." 9 Drahozal analogizes to the domestic setting, where little information is available about the law arbitrators apply. As he explains, although the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that
the decision to resolve a dispute in arbitration rather than in litigation
should only accomplish a change in forum and not a change in substantive law,' 0 we do not as an empirical matter know enough about
the bases for arbitrators' judgments and hence whether this important
assertion is accurate.
Professor Ellen Deason takes us to another aspect of rulemaking
on ADR in a transnational context. Deason, who has previously examined the issue of confidentiality in mediation, here writes about
ProceduralRules for Complementary Systems of Litigation and MediationWorldwide." Deason examines two statutes, the Uniform Mediation
Act, a domestic law, and the Model Law of International Commercial
Conciliation, created by the United Nations Commission on International Trade, both of which address the issue of the confidentiality of
mediation. Deason asks whether structures should be established to
permit mediated agreements to be enforced in a summary fashion
that is analogous to the expedited enforcement provided to arbitration awards by the Federal Arbitration Act and the New York Conven6 Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Out of National Law: An EmpiricalLook at
the New Law Merchant, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 523 (2005).
7 Id.
8
9

Id. at 526.
Id.

10 See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)
(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985)).
11 Ellen E. Deason, ProceduralRules for Complementary Systems of Litigation and Mediation-Worldwide, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 553 (2005).
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tion. Because Deason views mediation as focused on "selfdetermination, voluntariness, and mediator neutrality," 12 and litigation as focused on "[a] ccessible justice, open court proceedings, effective enunciation of rights, consistent outcomes, and the fundamental
rule of law,"' 13 Deason questions whether a summary enforcement
process for mediated agreements can be used without undermining
important values underlying mediation or litigation.
We next move from these discussions of ADR to court-based
processes. In her article, Procedure as Contract,14 Professor Judith Resnik argues that during much of the twentieth century, civil processes
in the United States relied on a conceptual framework anchored in
the constitutional and common law of due process. More recently,
the case law looks to doctrines of contract and agency law to enforce
contracts to preclude litigation and to encourage the entry of contracts to conclude litigation. As she puts it, while once "bargaining in
the shadow of the law" was the phrase invoked, today bargaining is a
requirement of the law of conflict resolution, both civil and criminal.
Resnik argues that proceduralists need to debate what the law of
"Contract Procedure" ought to provide. She considers the extent to
which parties ought to be able to contract for jurisdiction, for choice
of law, and for privacy, and how much law ought to regulate judges, as
they shape settlements, enter settlements, and enforce settlements.
Her claim is that even as "Contract Procedure" supplements and
sometimes supplants "Due Process Procedure," judges must function
within a due process framework to legitimate their own
decisionmaking.
Judge Lee Rosenthal, current chair of the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States and a federal district judge for the Southern District of Texas, offers her views
in the article One Judge's Perspective on Procedure as Contract.15 She examines the law on the obligation to arbitrate. Judge Rosenthal parses
the doctrine to identify what issues are to be decided, at least at the
first instance, by arbitrators. She also explores how Supreme Court
doctrines unrelated to arbitration-such as rulings on punitive damages-make more or less appealing alternatives to courts. Further,
she considers the role that judges play as gatekeepers by deciding

12 Id. at 555.
13 Id.
14 Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593 (2005).
15 Lee H. Rosenthal, One Judge's Perspective on Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 669 (2005).
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when contractual arbitration agreements have been entered and
when parties can extract themselves from such provisions.
The symposium concludes with an article by Professor Jean Sternlight, who helps to guide teachers of procedure and of ADR to an
integrated approach to the two areas. A teacher and scholar in both
fields, Sternlight addresses the fact that while these two procedural
disciplines are increasingly united and intertwined in the real world
they remain segregated in legal academia. Her article, Separate and
Not Equal: Integrating Civil Procedure and ADR in Legal Academia,16 explains that civil procedure courses usually spend little time on ADR
and that ADR courses similarly typically spend little time on intersectional subjects such as the enforcement of mediation agreements or
offers ofjudgment. Sternlight argues that we need to do a better job
of blending these fields in both our teaching and our writing, and that
the payoff will be great in terms not only of the education of our students but also the way that we think about the meaning of procedure
and justice. In her view, recognizirlg the linkages between all of the
various approaches to dispute resolution "allows us to explore more
fully the nature of procedural justice." 17 As well, recognizing the common themes that underlie these fields will help us to consider whether
multiple approaches to dispute resolution may be desirable in a given
society to meet our various justice-related goals.
As you shall see, this set of articles contributes to a growing literature and invites yet more exchange about the interaction between the
worlds of civil procedure and ADR. We hope that these ongoing discussions will support our aspirations for processes that provide and
express commitments to justice.

16 Jean R. Sternlight, Separate and Not Equal: IntegratingCivil Procedure and ADR in
Legal Academia, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 681 (2005).
17 Id. at 717.
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